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Ethics deals with norms and values and especially with what is good and bad
（G. E. Moore 1903）. Many kinds of illocutionary acts such as evaluations,
pledges, directives, recommendations, prohibitions, authorizations and permissions
are capital in ethics. Thanks to illocutionary logic（J. R. Searle & D. Vanderveken
1985, D. Vanderveken1990－91,2004）one can now interpret all kinds of sentences
that are used in ethics including imperative, performative, exclamatory and ought
sentences and analyze the felicity conditions of capital ethical illocutions. One can
also formalize valid practical and theoretical inferences made in the conduct of
ethical discourses. From an illocutionary point of view, any evaluation according
to which it is good（or bad）to do an action commits the speaker to giving the
directive “Do（or do not do）that action !” Illocutionary logic can explain the
logical structure and dynamics of ethical discourses like justifications, exhortations
and confessions that have a conversational goal. As I have pointed out in2001,
interlocutors must obey constitutive rules in order to conduct such discourses which
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are illocutions of higher level. My main purpose here will be to use the resources
of illocutionary logic in order to analyze capital illocutions of ethics and give a
better account of moral obligation, permission and prohibition than that of the
traditional deontic logic of G. H. von Wright（1951,1968）. This paper is part of a
chapter on Principia Ethica of my forthcoming book Speech Acts in Dialogue
where I enrich and revise deontic logic within illocutionary logic in order to state all
kinds of logically valid laws of ethics and eliminate well known deontic paradoxes.
1．Issues and theoretical objectives
According to speech act theory, the primary units of meaning and
communication in a context of utterance are not isolated true or false propositions
but rather speech acts of the type called by J. L. Austin（1962）illocutionary acts
which have felicity rather than truth conditions. Until now speech act theory has
mainly studied first level illocutionary acts that individual speakers attempt to
perform by using sentences at single moments of utterance. Most basic first level
illocutionary acts are elementary illocutionary acts of the form F（P）like assertions,
promises, directives, gifts and thanks. As Gotllob Frege（1918－23）pointed out,
they have a force F and a propositional content P . Requests, recommendations,
commands, interdictions, promises, pledges, submissions, vows, decisions and
pardons are capital elementary illocutions of ethics and religion. By nature all kinds
of illocutions are intrinsically intentional actions that agents perform voluntarily by
making a mental and most often a verbal attempt. Their main felicity conditions
are their success and their satisfaction conditions. In order to be happy speakers
who attempt to perform an illocution should succeed and perform a non defective
illocution which should moreover be or turn to be satisfied in the world. In order
to succeed , speakers must correctly express attempted public illocutionary acts by
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using appropriate words and speak in an adequate context. A baptism is not
successful when the priest uses the wrong proper name or christens the wrong baby.
A successful illocution is non defective when the speaker is sincere and only makes
true presuppositions. Speakers generally relate propositional contents of elementary
illocutions to the world with the aim of establishing a correspondence between
words and things from a certain direction of fit. This is why most illocutions have
conditions of satisfaction. The notion of satisfaction is a generalization of that of
truth needed to cover all forces. An assertion is satisfied when it is true ;
a promise when it is kept ; a command when it is obeyed and a blessing when it
places the hearer in a state of God’s grace.
As Searle and I（1985）pointed out, the principal component of each force is
its primary illocutionary point that determines the direction of fit of illocutions with
that force. The direction of fit of illocutions determines from which direction the
correspondence must be achieved between words and things. The five illocutionary
points are : the assertive, the commissive, the directive, the declaratory and the
expressive points. They correspond to the four possible directions of fit that exist
between words and things in language use. Illocutionary acts with the assertive
point（e.g. assertions, acknowledgements, testimonies, predictions and blames）have
the words-to-things direction of fit. Their point is to represent how things are in
the world . In the case of assertive utterances, the used words must correspond to
the objects of reference as they stand or will stand in the world. Thus, assertive
illocutions are satisfied when their propositional content represents a fact which
exists or will exist in general independently in the world of the utterance.
Illocutionary acts with the commissive or directive point have the things-to-words
direction of fit. The point of commissive illocutions like pledges, promises, threats,
vows and renunciations is to commit the speaker to a course of action , while the
point of directive illocutions like requests, solicitations, prayers, commands and
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recommendations is to make an attempt to get the hearer to carry out an action .
In the case of such illocutions, the objects of reference in the world have to be
changed by one protagonist of the utterance in order to correspond to the words
used. The responsibility for changing the world lies with the speaker in the case of
commissives and with the hearer in the case of directives. Thus commissive and
directive illocutions are satisfied when their speaker or hearer transforms the world
in order to fit their propositional content.
Illocutions with the declaratory illocutionary point（e. g. decisions, gifts,
pardons, condemnations and blessings）have the double direction of fit. Their
point is to get the world to match the propositional content by saying that the
propositional content matches the world. In successful declarations, objects of
reference are changed by the speaker at the moment of utterance in order to
correspond to used words in the very utterance of these words. As Austin said, in
making successful performative utterances, agents do things with words. Every
successful declaration is satisfied because the speaker performs at the moment of
utterance the represented action by way of representing himself as performing then
that very action. Successful declarations are assertions that always make their
propositional content true by virtue of the utterance. They have both the things-to-
words and the words-to-things direction of fit . For some elementary illocutions,
there is no question of success or failure of fit. Illocutions with the expressive
point like thanks, apologies, complaints, congratulations and boasts have the empty
direction of fit. Their point is just to express propositional attitudes of the speaker
about the fact represented by the propositional content. Propositional attitudes are
individual attitudes of the form M（P）like beliefs, previsions, convictions, desires,
wishes and intentions which have a psychological mode M and a propositional
content P . In purely expressive utterances, speakers do not attempt to establish a
correspondence between words and things. They just want to manifest verbally
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their propositional attitudes about the ways in which objects are in the world. They
presuppose then the existence of the fact that inspires their attitude. So purely
expressive illocutions do not have proper conditions of satisfaction. Expressive
illocutionary acts are just appropriate or inappropriate. An expressive illocution is
appropriate when the speaker expresses an attitude whose mode is right for the
represented fact and when the fact that inspires that attitude is really existent. Thus
it is inappropriate to thank someone for an action that was very bad or that he or she
did not carry out.
Some complex first level illocutionary acts are not reducible to elementary
illocutions. So are acts of illocutionary denegation such as refusals and disapprovals
which are of the form ¬F（P）whose aim is to make explicit the non-performance
by the speaker of an illocution F（P）; conditional illocutionary acts such as offers
which are of the form（P⇒ F（Q））whose aim is to perform an illocutionary act
F（Q）, not categorically, but on the condition that a proposition P is true ;
and conjunctions of illocutionary acts such as warnings of the form（F1（P1）＆
F2（P2））whose aim is to perform simultaneously two illocutionary acts F1（P1）and
F2（P2）. A refusal is the illocutionary denegation of an acceptance, an offer is
a promise that is conditional on the hearer’s acceptance, and a warning is the
conjunction of an assertion that something is the case and of a suggestion to the
hearer to do something about it. Complex first level illocutions that are capital in
ethics are conditional directives, acts of granting permission, authorizations, offers
and warnings.
Assertions can be false, promises violated and commands disobeyed. However
one needs a unified theory of success, satisfaction and truth in illocutionary logic.
Whoever attempts to perform an illocution knows under which conditions that
illocution is satisfied. Moreover, the satisfaction of elementary illocutions requires
the truth of their propositional content. Whoever follows a recommendation
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does the recommended action. Some illocutions have stronger felicity conditions
than others. Certain illocutions strongly commit the speaker to other illocutions :
One cannot perform these illocutions without eo ipso performing the others.
Thus recommendations contain advice. Second certain illocutions have stronger
satisfaction conditions than others. When a speaker keeps his promise the assertion
that he does the promised action turns to be true. Third certain illocutions cannot
be performed unless others are satisfied. Whoever gives his pardon to someone
makes the true assertion that that person is forgiven. Conversely certain illocutions
cannot be satisfied unless others are or were performed. One can only obey a
command which has been given. According to Searle and I（1985）, literal
performative utterances are declarations according to which the speaker performs
the illocution named by their main performative verb. In understanding felicity
conditions, interlocutors make practical and theoretical valid inferences. They
understand that certain illocutions cannot be felicitous unless others are. So any
competent speaker infers from a premise of the form “Any man is rational and
Socrates is a man” the conclusion “Socrates is rational”（theoretical inference）.
Similarly, he or she infers from a premise of the form “You should help others” the
conclusion “Help others !” From a logical point of view, conclusions of theoretical
inferences have the words-to-things direction of fit, while conclusions of practical
inferences have the things-to-words direction of fit. We need a recursive unified
theory of felicity in order to account for all this.
2．Progress and methodology
Until now speech act theory has mainly tended to study first level illocutions.
Searle and I（1985）have stated the principles of a theory of felicity for first level
illocutions. The notion of force is not a primitive notion of illocutionary logic.
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We have decomposed each force into six components, namely : its primary
illocutionary point, its mode of achievement of that point, its propositional content
conditions, its preparatory and sincerity conditions, and its degree of strength .
We also recursively defined the set of all possible illocutionary forces and success
conditions of elementary illocutions. The five primitive forces are the simplest
forces with an illocutionary point. These are : the force of assertion expressed by
the declarative sentential type ; the primitive force of a commitment to an action
named by the performative verb “commit” ; the primitive force of a linguistic
attempt to get the hearer to act expressed by the imperative sentential type ; the
force of declaration expressed in performative utterances, and the primitive force of
expression of a speaker’s attitude expressed by the exclamatory sentential type. All
primitive forces are universal.
All other more complex forces are obtained by adding to primitive forces
new linguistically significant modes of achievement of illocutionary point, new
propositional content conditions, new preparatory or new sincerity conditions, or
by increasing or decreasing the degree of strength. Thus a request is a directive
with a special courteous mode of achievement of the directive point : the speaker
then gives option of refusal to the hearer. A question is a request that the hearer
gives an answer to that question（special propositional content condition）. An act
of praying is a strong request with a humble and earnest mode of achievement and
the special sincerity condition that the speaker expresses respect to the hearer. A
directive suggestion is a weak attempt to get the hearer to act（weak degree of
strength）. A recommendation is a directive suggestion with the special preparatory
condition that the recommended action is both good for the hearer and good in
general. When added components are transcendent, complex forces are universal.
The force of recommendation is universal for one can express that actions are good
in general and good for someone in all human languages. When added components
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are immanent to peculiar languages, obtained complex forces are not universal.
The declaratory force of excommunication is specific to linguistic communities
which can refer to the sacrament of communion. For to excommunicate is to
exclude by declaration a person from the community of Christians by excluding
him or her from communion. All capital elementary illocutions of ethics have a
complex force with special components.
As Searle and I pointed out, the felicity conditions of elementary illocutions are
entirely determined by the components of their force and their propositional content.
Agents obey constitutive rules determined by force components in their attempted
performance of elementary illocutions. Thus whoever attempts to perform an
elementary illocution of the form F（P）in a context of utterance must first of all
attempt to achieve the illocutionary point of the force F on the proposition P with
the required mode of achievement of that force. In order to achieve a force F on a
proposition P the agent has of course to express that force and that proposition in
the context of utterance. So the agent must attempt then to express a proposition P
that satisfies the propositional content conditions of the force F in the context.
Thirdly he or she must also presuppose all propositions determined by the
preparatory conditions of force F for the propositional content P and finally he
or she must attempt to express with the degree of strength of F all attitudes of the
form M（P）whose psychological mode M is determined by the sincerity conditions
of force F . For example, whoever attempts to make a promise must address an
utterance to a hearer with the intention of committing himself or herself to carrying
out an action（commissive illocutionary point and propositional content condition of
a promise）while putting himself or herself under the obligation to carry out that
action（special mode of realization of the commissive point peculiar to promise）and
presuppose moreover that the promised action is then good for that hearer（special
preparatory condition of promise）.
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By definition, an attempted illocution of the form F（P） is successfully
performed in a context of utterance when the speaker succeeds in achieving the
illocutionary point of the force F on the content P with the required mode of
achievement and the proposition P satisfies the propositional content conditions of
force F in the context, when he or she presupposes well all propositions determined
by preparatory conditions of illocution F（P）and when he or she succeeds in
expressing with the required degree of strength all propositional attitudes M（P）
determined by the sincerity conditions of force F . Whoever makes a successful
promise expresses a strong intention to act. When the speaker uses wrong words
and fails to express the force or the propositional content of an attempted illocution,
he or she fails to communicate to hearers his or her intention to perform that
illocution. It happens that speakers presuppose false propositions or express
attitudes that they do not have. A successful illocution is defective when one
proposition that enters into its preparatory conditions is false or when the speaker
lies and does not possess an attitude that enters into its sincerity conditions.
An attempted first level illocution is non-defective in a context when it is successful
and all its preparatory and sincerity conditions are then fulfilled. Austin with his
notion of felicity-condition did not distinguish clearly between successful utterances
that are defective and utterances that are not even successful. On one hand there
are limits to success. No one can successfully advise a hearer to have done
something. For one can only achieve the directive point on propositions that
represent a present or future action of the hearer. Any attempt to give a directive
with a past propositional content would be a failure. This is why we never try to
give such directives. Such limits to success show themselves in language. There
are no well-formed imperative sentences whose main verb names a past action of the
hearer. One can succeed in giving advice which is bad for the hearer（failure of a
preparatory condition）or that one does not wish to be followed（failure of sincerity
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conditions）. In illocutionary logic, felicity conditions of illocutionary acts are the
sum of their success, preparatory, sincerity and satisfaction conditions.
By virtue of its logical form each attempted illocutionary act commits the
speaker to many other acts. An illocution strongly commits the speaker to another
when he or she could not then perform that illocution without performing the other.
All predictions contain an assertion but not conversely. Assertions about the past
are not predictions. Whoever means to perform an illocution eo ipso attempts to
perform others with less success-conditions. But agents are also committed to
performing stronger illocutions. Whoever replies to an assertion by saying the
contrary does more than assert the negation of its propositional content. He then
contradicts the previous speaker. As Searle and I pointed out, speakers are also
weakly committed to illocutions that they do not overtly perform. Whoever agrees
to help everybody is committed to agreeing to help you even if he did not make any
reference to you. Literal utterances like “I agree to help everybody and I refuse to
help you” are paradoxical. Attempts can fail. But whoever attempts to perform an
illocution is weakly committed to that illocution. Could we explicate to which
illocutions a speaker is weakly committed ? There is a Brouwerian reflexive and
symmetrical relation of agentive compatibility in the logic of action of illocutionary
logic. Two moments are compatible as regards an agent when that agent could
simultaneously perform all actions that he or she performs at these two moments.
By definition a speaker is weakly committed to a first level illocution at a moment of
utterance when he or she could perform that illocution at any moment that is
compatible with that moment as regards that agent. All the laws governing weak
illocutionary commitment follow from this definition.
A speaker succeeds in performing a conjunction of two illocutions of the form
（F1（P1）＆ F2（P2））in a context if and only he or she succeeds in performing
the two illocutions F1（P1） and F2（P2）. Unlike illocutionary conjunction,
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illocutionary negation and illocutionary conditional are not success functional
operations on illocutions. The performance of the illocutionary denegation of
an illocution ¬F（P）requires more than the non-performance of that illocution
F（P）. From the fact that one did not accept an offer it does not follow that
one refused it. Similarly the performance of the conditional illocutionary act
（P⇒ F（Q）） requires more than the falsehood of the antecedent proposition P
or the performance of the illocution F（Q）. Any successful performance of
an illocution in a context requires an attempt which somehow restricts the set of
possible contexts of utterance which are illocutionarily compatible with that context.
Two contexts with the same speaker are illocutionarily compatible when all
illocutions that he or she performs in one could be performed in the other that is
to say when their moments of utterance are compatible as regards that speaker.
In my approach, a speaker succeeds in performing an illocutionary denegation of
the form ¬F（P）in a context when that speaker attempts to perform that act of
denegation and he or she does not perform the denegated illocution F（P）in any
context which is illocutionary compatible with that context. Similarly, a speaker
succeeds in performing a conditional illocutionary act of the form（P⇒ F（Q））in a
context when he or she attempts to perform that conditional illocutionary act and he
or she is committed to performing categorically the illocutionary act F（Q）in all
illocutionarily compatible contexts when the antecedent proposition P is or turns to
true. Whoever performs a conditional illocutionary act（P⇒ F（Q））is committed
to performing categorically the illocution F（Q）when the antecedent proposition P is
then true. Often the agent of a conditional illocution（P⇒ F（Q））does not know
at the moment of utterance whether the antecedent proposition P is or will turn to be
true especially when the proposition is future. In that case that agent does not
know whether he is then committed to the categorical illocution F（Q）.
Complex illocutions also have satisfaction, preparatory and sincerity conditions.
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A conjunction of two illocutions is satisfied（and non defective）if and only if these
two illocutions are satisfied（and non defective）. A warning that the road is
slippery is satisfied when the speaker makes a true assertion and the hearer follows
his advice. An act of illocutionary denegation ¬F（P）is satisfied when the agent
does not perform the denegated illocution F（P）. So any successful illocutionary
denegation is satisfied. A conditional illocution（P⇒ F（Q））is satisfied if and
only if the categorical illocution F（Q）is satisfied when the antecedent proposition P
is or turns to be true. The satisfaction of an accepted offer of help requires that the
speaker keeps his promise of help. In performing complex illocutions speakers
express complex attitudes like sums and denegations of attitudes and conditional
attitudes, which are not reducible to propositional attitudes. In performing a
conjunction of two illocutions in a context presupposes all propositions and
expresses all attitudes that are respectively determined by the preparatory and
the sincerity conditions of these illocutions in that context. One possesses the
conjunction（or the sum）of two attitudes at a moment when one possesses these
two attitudes. Whoever makes a warning expresses a belief in the truth of the
propositional content and a desire that the hearer reacts in following one’s advice.
In performing acts of illocutionary denegations ¬F（P）speakers presuppose they
could then perform denegated illocutions and they express psychological denegations
of attitudes of denegated illocutions. One possesses the denegation of an attitude
of the form ¬M（P）like a disbelief when one feels that one does not possess the
denegated attitude e. g. the belief. Whoever refuses a gift expresses discord and
presupposes that he or she could have accepted. A discord is the psychological
denegation of the state of agreement, just as a refusal is the illocutionary denegation
of an acceptance. In performing conditional illocutions of the form（P⇒ F（Q））
speakers presuppose conditional propositions of the form（P⇒ R）where R is a
proposition determined by the preparatory condition of illocution A in the context.
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They also express conditional attitudes of the form（P⇒ M（Q））where M（Q）is an
attitude that is a sincerity condition of illocution A . One possesses a conditional
attitude of the form（P⇒ M（Q））when one feels that one would possess the
attitude M（Q）if the antecedent proposition were or turned to be true. Whoever
promises help to a person if something bad happens presupposes that he or she can
help and that it would be good for that person in that case. He or she also
expresses the conditional belief that he or she can help and the conditional intention
to help the person if the bad event occurs.
John Searle and I（1985） analyzed the meaning of English force-markers
and performative verbs. We pointed out that most force markers contain modifiers
of sentential type expressing particular force components. So sentences with
the same syntactic type can express illocutions with different forces. Imperative
sentences like “Do it please !”, “Do it whether you like it or not !” and “Do it, it
is good for you !” respectively express a request, a peremptory directive and an
advice. Unfortunately Searle and I（1985）did not analyze in detail the nature of
propositional contents of illocutions and their satisfaction-conditions. Speech act
theory requires a finer criterion of propositional identity than logical equivalence.
For many propositions with the same truth conditions are not the senses of
synonymous clauses. Moreover most logically equivalent propositions are not the
contents of successful illocutions with the same forces and of possessed propositional
attitudes with the same modes. We can assert and believe that Istanbul is a city
without asserting and believing that it is a city and not a sphere. The sentences
“Istanbul is a city” and “Istanbul is a city and not a sphere” do not express the same
proposition. However they express two logically equivalent propositions true in
exactly the same possible circumstances.
In order to explicate this, I have formulated in the past decades a non-classical
natural predicative logic of propositions that takes into account the acts of
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predication that we make in expressing and understanding propositions. My
predicative approach respects the double nature of propositions which are both
senses of sentences and contents of elementary illocutions and propositional
attitudes. It describes their structure of constituents and explicates how we
understand their truth conditions. I have first formulated in Meaning and Speech
Acts（1990－91）a simple predicative propositional logic that analyses propositions
representing atomic facts and their truth functions. However speakers are also
oriented towards past, present and future facts, they distinguish between actual and
possible facts and make generalisations. They moreover intend and attempt to
perform their successful illocutions and express then all kinds of attitudes. We
need to represent modal, general, past, present and future facts as well as first
level actions and attitudes of agents in the ideography of illocutionary logic in order
to formulate the theory of felicity of illocutions. Over the past decade I have added
to predicative propositional logic logical and historic modalities and ramified time
in2005a and2008, generalization in2013a and2015, first level actions in2005b
and2014and attitudes in2008and2009.
By definition the satisfaction of elementary illocutions requires the truth of
their propositional content. In order that an elementary illocutionary act F（P）be
satisfied in a context, its propositional content P must be true in the circumstance of
utterance. In philosophical logic, expressed propositions are true or false in so-
called possible circumstances that contain a moment of time. Certain possible
circumstances are actual . They belong to the actual course of action of our real
world. Others belong to possible courses of action of our world where there exist
more or less individual objects or where objects of the real world have other
properties. Now we, human agents, live in an indeterminist world where the future
is open. According to indeterminism , the ways in which things are at a moment
are not entirely determined by the ways in which they were before. In particular
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our actions and attitudes are not determined. Whenever we do or think something,
we could have done or thought something else, or nothing at all.
We need a ramified conception of time in order to account for indeterminism
and freedom. In branching time each moment represents a complete possible state
of the actual world at a given instant. Paradigmatic moments of time are moments
of utterance during which we can use a sentence. Whoever says “now” refers to the
very moment of his utterance. Every discourse is conducted during a discontinuous
sequence of successive moments of utterance. There is a single causal route to the
past but multiple future routes. For several incompatible moments of time might
directly follow a moment of utterance in the future of the world. When a speaker
makes an offer to a hearer in a dialogue, that hearer can reply in several ways : he
or she can accept, refuse or make a counteroffer. The hearer can also ignore that
offer. The moment of utterance of the offer belongs then to several histories with
the same past and present but different historic continuations.
Consequently, the set of moments of time is a tree-like frame of the following
form :
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A maximal chain h of moments of time is called a history. It represents
a possible course of history of our world . Like Nuel Belnap（1992,2001）,
I think that possible circumstances , where propositions are true or false, are pairs
of a moment of time and of a history to which that moment belongs. Thanks
to histories temporal logic can analyze modal notions like settled truth and
the different kinds of causal , historic and universal necessity and possibility.
Certain propositions are true at a moment according to all histories. Their truth
is then settled at that moment no matter how the world continues. So are past
propositions and propositions according to which agents perform elementary
illocutions and possess propositional attitudes. Whoever attempts to perform an
elementary illocution either succeeds or fails to perform that illocution at the
moment of utterance. He or she succeeds when all success conditions are fulfilled
at that moment and he or she fails otherwise. Unlike the success and the failure,
the satisfaction or the insatisfaction of attempted elementary illocutions oriented
towards the future and of conditional illocutions whose antecedent proposition is
future is not settled at each moment of utterance. Contrary to the past, the future is
open. The world can continue in various ways after most moments of utterance.
Thus the truth or the falsehood of future propositional contents of elementary
illocutions is not at all settled at these moments. It depends on what will be their
actual historical continuation. When there are different possible historic
continuations of a moment, its actual future continuation is not then determined. It
can be true at that moment according to one possible historic continuation of that
moment and false at that moment according to another historic continuation.
As W. of Ockham（1321－23）pointed out, if the world continues after a
moment, it will continue in a unique way. Like Ockham and contrary to Belnap,
I believe that each non-final moment will have a unique real historic continuation
even if that continuation is still undetermined at that very moment. Indeterminism
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cannot prevent that uniqueness. According to standard philosophy of mind human
agents, who are directed by virtue of their intentionality towards things and facts
of the world, are intrinsically oriented at each moment of their life towards the
real continuation of the world. We all ignore now how the world will continue
but we are intrinsically oriented at each moment of utterance towards the real
continuation of that moment and we always distinguish conceptually that real from
other possible continuations whenever our actions or thoughts are directed towards
the future. Whoever requests, wishes or offers future help requests, wishes or
offers help in the real future. So in my approach our illocutions and attitudes at
each moment have or will have a certain satisfaction value even if that satisfaction
value is still undetermined when they are oriented towards the future. In order to
keep a present promise and execute a present intention to help someone later, the
speaker must help that person in the real continuation of the world. Other possible
historic continuations do not matter. All possible circumstances whether actual or
not have a proper world of utterance whose course of history contains the real
historic continuation of their moment of utterance.
In order for an elementary illocution to be satisfied , it is not enough that its
propositional content is or turns to be true and corresponds to an existing fact in the
real historic continuation of the moment of utterance. The correspondence between
words and things must be established from the proper direction of fit of its force.
When an illocution has the things-to-words direction of fit, it is or it will be satisfied
if and only if its propositional content is or turns to be true because of its
performance. Whoever follows a recommendation must do what is recommended
because of that recommendation. There is often an over determination of reasons.
An agent can do a recommended action for several reasons. But one of his reasons
is that he or she intends then to follow that recommendation. Whoever has
forgotten a previous recommendation cannot follow it.
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In ramified temporal logic, two moments of time are coinstantaneous when
they belong to the same instant. Coinstantaneous moments are on the same
horizontal line in each tree-like frame. Each moment of time is of course
coinstantaneous with itself. So in the last figure m3, m4, m5 and m6 are four
coinstantaneous moments. Two possible circumstances are coinstantaneous when
their moments are coinstantaneous. One analyzes historic necessity by quantifying
over coinstantaneous moments. The proposition that P is then necessary（in
symbols □P） is true at a circumstance when the truth of P is settled at all
coinstantaneous circumstances. The notion of historic necessity is stronger than
that of settled truth. The historically necessary fact is not only established but
inevitable. According to traditional philosophy there are no inevitable actions and
intentions. So when an agent carries out an action at a moment he or she could
then not have carried it out. The notions of logical or universal necessity are
stronger than historic necessity. The proposition that P is universally necessary（in
symbols : ■P） is true in a circumstance when P is true in all possible
circumstances. In that case the represented fact is objectively necessary and always
inevitable. The inexistence of that fact is then objectively impossible.
As Belnap pointed out, the possible causes and effects so to speak of actions
of any agent at a moment are limited to those which are possible outcomes of
the way the world has been up to that moment. In order to explicate historical
relevance we must then consider coinstantaneous moments having the same past.
Such moments are called alternative moments in my logic. Thus m7, m8 and m9
are alternative moments in figure1. A proposition is causally necessary in a
circumstance when that proposition is true in all possible circumstances which are
compatible with the laws of nature that prevail in the world of that circumstance.
So when a circumstance is causally compatible with another circumstance all the
facts that exist in the world of that circumstance respect the laws of nature prevailing
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in the other circumstance.2）
Until now speech-act theorists have mainly tended to study first level
illocutions. Searle and I（1985）have only analysed the felicity conditions of
such illocutions. However, we most often use language in order to conduct
dialogues with interlocutors. Natural languages are by nature public languages.
Above all, the use of language is a social form of linguistic behaviour. Can
we extend speech act theory to deal with discourse and formulate a logic of
conversation ? Both L. Wittgenstein（1958）in his Philosophical Investigations and
Searle（1992）have expressed skepticism. However as I pointed out in 2001,
protagonists always perform in any discourse master illocutionary acts with the
intention of achieving together proper linguistic goals that are conversational goals
corresponding to a possible direction of fit between words and things. Interlocutors
in conversation sooner or later share the collective intention to describe the world
（descriptive conversational goal）, to deliberate on what to do（deliberative goal）, to
change things by way of declarations （declaratory conversational goal）; they
moreover always intend to express collective attitudes（expressive conversational
goal）on facts of the world that they presuppose to be existent. As one would
expect, discourses with the word-to-world direction of fit （like presentations,
theoretical debates, reports, and interrogations）have a descriptive goal: they serve
to describe how things are in the world. Discourses with the world-to-word
direction of fit （like negotiations, practical debates, exhortations, attempts to
come to an agreement and sermons） have a deliberative goal: they serve to
deliberate on what to do in the world. Discourses with the double direction of fit
（like appointments, moral codes, inaugurations, and absolutions of sins at the end
2）The relation of compatibility between possible circumstances corresponding to causal necessity
is reflexive and transitive but not symmetric. For new laws of nature might prevail in the world
of a possible circumstance causally compatible with another which would prevent facts existing in
that other circumstance.
PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS IN ILLOCUTIONARY LOGIC 49
of confessions at church）have a declaratory goal: they serve to do things in the
world by declarations. Discourses with no direction of fit（like exchange of
greetings, expressions of respect and submission, eulogies） have an expressive
goal : they serve to express publicly attitudes of protagonists.
Dialogues which have a proper conversational goal are joint illocutions of
higher-level irreducible to sequences of individual instantaneous illocutions.
Several agents perform them in turn and they last over an interval of time.
They have a conversational type and theme and their conduct requires cooperation.
The logic of discourse, as I conceive it, aims to study not all possible language-
games but only those with a proper linguistic goal. As Searle（2001）now admits,
one can formulate a logic of such discourses because their protagonists obey
constitutive rules in conducting them. Most discourses of ethics and religion have
a conversational goal. Justifications and prophesies are descriptive, exhortations
and sermons deliberative, moral codes and condemnations declaratory and public
manifestations of respect and submission to God expressive. I will only analyze
here first level capital illocutions of ethics. I will analyze the structure and
dynamism of religious discourses at the next meeting of the international Institute of
Philosophy at Dubrovnik.
3．The need to integrate illocutionary logic
in a logic of attitudes and actions
Like R. Montague（1974）, I believe that pragmatics should use the resources
of formalisms and philosophical and mathematical logic in order to establish a
rigorous theory of meaning and use . Natural languages can be learned by human
agents whose cognitive abilities are both creative and limited. Formalisms enable
us to construct better models of linguistic competence and understanding. However
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as I explained in2013b, one must revise basic hypotheses of standard philosophical
logics of propositions, attitudes and actions in order to analyze adequately felicity-
conditions of illocutions. Speech act theory not only requires a much finer criterion
of propositional identity than logical equivalence. But it also requires explicating
the intentionality and imperfect but minimal rationality of interlocutors and the
generation of their speech acts in the logic of action.
Standard logics of attitudes based on J. Hintikka’s（1962,1971） approach
and the standard logic of action of N. Belnap & M. Perloff（1992,2001） are
defective. In Hintikka’s epistemic logic, human agents are logically omniscient.
They know and believe all logically necessary propositions. For in Hintikka’s
approach, possible circumstances are compatible with the truth of agents’ beliefs
and the realization of their desires at each moment of time. An agent believes
a proposition P at a moment m according to Hintikka when that proposition P is
true in every circumstance where all beliefs of that agent at that moment are true.
On this account, we, human agents, know all logically necessary propositions and
our beliefs are closed under logical implication. Whoever believes a proposition P
also believes all propositions that P logically implies. However we ignore many
essential properties of objects which persist in the world. In my terminology
essential properties are properties that objects really have in all possible
circumstances. For example, each human agent has the essential property of
having certain parents and a genetic code. We learn a posteriori empiric essential
properties and we ignore some of them. Abandoned children can ignore the identity
of their parents. Certain adopted children are wrong about their identity. Moreover
according to the standard approach agents are either perfectly rational or they are
totally irrational. But as the Greek philosophers pointed out, when we are
inconsistent we do not eo ipso believe everything. It is paradoxical to believe every
proposition（this is the so-called paradox of sophism）.
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As Nuel Belnap pointed out, we need a ramified conception of time and
modalities in order to account for physical indeterminism and the apparent freedom
of agents. However Belnap’s indeterminist logic of action ignore the very
intentionality of agents and it also does not analyse adequately their agentive
commitments. I have explained the principles of my logic of first level attitudes
and actions at recent Meetings of the International Institute of Philosophy at Zadar,
Moscow, Bucharest and Athens3）. My formal logic of attitudes and actions is
compatible with standard philosophy of mind and of action. On one hand,
my logic of attitudes deals with all cognitive and volitive propositional attitudes
and with complex first level conditional attitudes and psychological denegations
and conjunctions of simpler attitudes. My logic also explicates formally why we
are neither logically omniscient nor perfectly rational. It explains why human
agents a priori know certain logically necessary truths and why they always remain
minimally rational（C. Cherniak 1986） and make certain logical practical and
theoretical inferences.
My logic of first level actions revises and enriches Belnap’s standard logic of
action in order to take into account the intentionality and minimal rationality of
human agents. It is more general ; it deals with all kinds of first level actions, no
matter whether they are oriented towards the present or the future. Every
intentional action contains a present intention in action, few execute a prior
intention. In my approach, intentional actions are primary as in contemporary
philosophy. Unintentional actions are generated by intentional actions that agents
attempt to perform, and they could always in principle have been attempted.
Unlike intentions which are attitudes that we have, attempts are actions of a special
3）I have read my paper «Beliefs, Desires and Minimal Rationality» of 2008 at the Zadar
Meeting and the paper “Intentionality and Minimal Rationality in the Logic of Action” of2014at
the Athens Meeting.
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kind that we make. They are personal, intentional, conscious, free and successful.
Every agent can only make his or her individual attempts. When two agents
succeed in doing the same action（the same elementary illocution）, they do it thanks
to different personal attempts（in that case different utterances）. There are no
involuntary attempts. Each attempt is free. Whoever attempts to make an attempt
makes it. It is enough to try to make an attempt in order to make it. Direct
attempts by an agent to move parts of one’s body are real basic actions in the sense
of A. Goldman（1970）. When an agent forms the present intention to make a direct
movement, an attempt is caused by the very formation of that intention. Attempts
are means to achieve ends. Whoever makes an attempt makes that attempt in order
to achieve an objective. The agent can succeed or fail to reach his or her objective.
When the agent succeeds, his or her attempt is then satisfied . Otherwise it is
unsatisfied . In order to make a satisfied attempt, one must make a good attempt in
a right circumstance.
My logic of action formulates laws governing attempts. It explicates the
nature of our intentional and basic actions and it classifies the different kinds of
action generation in order to state adequate logical laws of agentive commitment.
Thanks to that logic of action illocutionary logic can now formulate a better theory
of felicity conditions. Any illocution is indeed an intrinsically intentional action.
Moreover commissive, directive and declaratory illocutions have propositional
contents that represent present or future actions of their speaker or hearer.
Illocutionary logic can moreover explicate by simple generation illocutionary
commitments to stronger illocutions. In contexts where certain propositional,
preparatory or sincerity conditions are fulfilled the successful performance of the
literal illocution simply generates illocutions with a stronger force.
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4．How to revise deontic logic within illocutionary logic
I agree with von Wright that deontic logic is primarily concerned with
moral norms like moral obligation , moral permission and moral prohibition .
Unfortunately G. H. von Wright does not explicate well such moral norms because
he does not take any account of capital illocutions of ethics underlying these norms.
First of all moral obligation is the only primitive deontic notion of von Wright’s
standard propositional deontic logic SDL of1951which contains the single logical
constant of moral obligation O in addition to the truth connectives of negation ~
and material implication → of elementary propositional logic. Formulas of the
form Op of SDL with a propositional formula p mean that it is morally obligatory
that p . According to von Wright one can derive the notions of moral permission,
moral prohibition and moral option from the primitive notion of moral obligation
and truth functions by the following abbreviations : Permitted p = def ~O~p ;
Forbidden p = def O~p ; and Optional p = def（~Op & ~O~p）, just like possibility,
impossibility and contingency are derived from necessity in modal logic.
On my view von Wright is wrong on that matter. For unlike obligations that
agents have, prohibitions, interdictions and permissions are before all illocutionary
acts that speakers perform in making utterances addressed to hearers. One needs
the conceptual apparatus of illocutionary logic in order to analyze their felicity
conditions. To forbid someone to do something is to order him or her not to do it.
So forbid p = def order~p . An act of forbidding is an order with a negative
propositional content which has the special mode of achievement of the directive
point that the speaker invokes a position of force or authority over the hearer.
Prohibitions are acts of forbidding an action not only at the moment of utterance
but over a long period of time（special propositional content condition）. To
interdict an action is to declare that it is prohibited . A permission is the
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illocutionary denegation of an act of forbidding . To permit someone to do
something is just to make clear that one does not forbid him or her to do it.
Thus permit p = def¬forbidp . Psychological and illocutionary denegations are
very different from propositional negation. ¬F（P）≠F（~P） and ¬M（P）≠
M（~P）. Whoever refuses a gift does not accept not to receive it. These
denegations moreover do not obey the law of double negation nor the law of
excluded middle. ¬¬F（P）≠F（P）and ¬¬M（P）≠M（P）. The denegation of a
permission to do something is not an order not do it. One can be discontent at
being discontent with a failure without being content with that failure. It is false
that every speaker either forbids or permits any action.
Incidentally given its wrong definitions of illocutions deontic logic proves a lot
of false theorems about capital illocutions of ethics and moral obligations. On one
hand, acts of forbidding, prohibition, interdiction and permission are illocutions
which cannot be defined in terms of agents’ obligations. On the other hand, as
speech act theory pointed out, obligations are imposed on agents by the very
performance of many illocutions. Thus any evaluation according to which it is
good（or bad）to carry out an action is a statement or a declaration that commits the
speaker to giving to hearers the directive Carry out（or Refrain from carrying out）
that action ! No matter whether it is assertive or declaratory, any evaluation
according to which an action is good（or bad）contains a recommendation to
the hearer to do（or to refrain from doing） that action. Moreover certain
commissive illocutions like promises and vows impose obligations on speakers,
just as directive illocutions like commands and prohibitions and declaratory
illocutions like interdictions can impose obligations on hearers . In addition to
moral obligations, there are also religious and juridical obligations. God’s Ten
Commandments impose religious obligations on believers, just as promulgations of
laws impose legal obligations on citizens of a country. So several illocutions with a
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non empty direction of fit impose（sometimes too many）obligations on agents. As
E. J. Lemmon（1962）pointed out, the third axiom schema of SDL according to
which all formulas of the form Op → ~O~p are axioms states a dubious law which
prevents standard deontic logic from representing moral dilemmas. Obligations can
be in conflict. Agents can be obliged for different reasons to realize incompatible
actions or actions with more or less moral value. In such cases one can doubt
that every moral obligation is a moral permission. Agents should then not be
permitted to perform all obligatory actions but only those which have moral priority.
Furthermore we often perform conditionally capital ethical illocutions in order
to impose conditional obligations on agents. We make conditional promises,
commandments and interdictions. A capital illocution of ethics is the fundamental
valid conditional directive : If it is good to do something, do it ! It imposes on
interlocutors the conditional obligation to realize an action if it is good. See
Vanderveken（2018） for more considerations on all kinds of valid laws that I
advocate for deontic logic within illocutionary logic.
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